A Reasonable Woman Approach to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) by Reinders, Lynne A.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 41
January 1992
A Reasonable Woman Approach to Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment: Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)
Lynne A. Reinders
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lynne A. Reinders, A Reasonable Woman Approach to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.
1991), 41 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 227 (1992)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol41/iss1/8
A REASONABLE WOMAN APPROACH TO
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: ELLISON V. BRADY, 924
F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes discrimination
based upon a person's gender.1 The United States Supreme Court,2
numerous other federal courts,3 and the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC)4 have declared unequivocally that sex dis-
crimination under Title VII encompasses sexual harassment in the
1. Title VII states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer.., to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's... sex." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aXl) (1988). Likewise, Title VII prohibits discrimination based upon
a person's race, color, religion, or natural origin. Id.
2. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that "a
claim of 'hostile environment' sex discrimination is actionable under Title VII").
3. Title VII claims for sexual harassment are a judicially created action not ex-
pressly addressed by the statute. Lower court cases were the first to find that discrimi-
nation under the Civil Rights Act included sexual harassment. The seminal case for
finding that sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII was Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (D.D.C. 1976) (stating that retaliatory actions of a male super-
visor due to resistance of his sexual advances, created an "artificial barrier to employ-
ment which was placed before one gender and not the other"), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Miller v. Bank of
America, 600 F.2d 211, 212 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating in dicta that Title VII applies
where a female employee rejects her supervisor's demands for sexual favors); Tomkins
v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048 (3d Cir. 1977) ("Title VII is
violated when a supervisor... makes sexual advances or demands toward a subordinate
employee."); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that Title
VII is violated when a woman must meet a supervisor's sexual demands in order to hold
on to her job); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir.
1977) (holding that a cause of action is stated under Title VII when a plaintiff alleges
that her discharge was a consequence of her refusing the sexual advances of her
supervisor).
4. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991). The EEOC guidelines explicitly state that the
amendment reaffirms the principle that sexual harassment is an unlawful employment
practice. Id. "[W]hile not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [the
EEOC guidelines] do constitute a body of experience and informed judgement to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
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workplace.5 Two distinct categories of sexual harassment claims have
emerged under Title VII:6 "quid pro quo"7 and "hostile environ-
ment."' The standard for judging a hostile environment sexual harass-
ment case has been subject to much dispute. In Ellison v. Brady,9 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the appropriate standard for
(1944)). See infra note 22 (discussing the details of the EEOC's guidelines on sexual
harassment).
5. For a discussion of the early development of sexual harassment doctrine, see in-
fra note 21.
6. For a discussion on the categorization of sexual harassment claims, see Note,
Sexual Harassment Claims ofAbusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L.
REv. 1449, 1454-55 (1984).
7. "Quid pro quo" harassment is beyond the scope of this Comment. This type of
harassment encompasses conduct that forces an employee to choose between acceding
to sexual demands or forfeiting job benefits, continued employment, or promotion. For
a discussion of "quid pro quo" harassment, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) (specifying burdens of proof in "quid pro quo" cases); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (laying out the elements necessary to estab-
lish a prima facie case of "quid pro quo" sexual harassment).
8. This type of sexual harassment claim challenges the persistent subjection of an
employee to a sexually intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. Courts
have found a Title VII claim for a hostile work environment to exist when employees
can allege and show the following five elements: (1) they belong to a protected group;
(2) they are subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) "the harassment complained
of was based upon [their] sex"; (4) the alleged harassment affected a "term, condition,
or privilege" of employment; and (5) if the employer is not the harassing party, that the
harassing party is the agent of the employer. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
903-05 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (finding that plaintiff had sufficiently shown all requisite ele-
ments to establish a prima facie case when she was subjected to demeaning sexual in-
quiries and vulgarities throughout the two years of her employment); see also Shrout v.
Black Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774, 780-81 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (finding that plaintiff
had established all requisite elements when it was shown that she was a victim of her
supervisor's sexual remarks and overt sexual behavior).
Courts have recognized that an offensive work environment alone, under appropriate
circumstances, can constitute Title VII sexual harassment without the necessity of the
harassed employee asserting or proving a tangible job detriment, while the detriment
element underlies the "quid pro quo" theory of sexual harassment. See, e.g., Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (harassment leading to noneconomic
injury can violate Title VII); Henson, 682 F.2d at 901 ("[Uinder certain circumstances
the creation of an offensive or hostile work environment due to sexual harassment can
violate Title VII irrespective of whether the complainant suffers tangible job detri-
ment."); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 4981) (same); cf Jones v.
Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[w]hile an employee need not prove
tangible job detriment to establish a sexual harassment claim, the absence of such detri-
ment requires a commensurately higher showing that the sexually harassing conduct
was pervasive and destructive of the working environment."), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1065 (1987).
9. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
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deciding "hostile environment" sexual harassment cases brought by
women is that conduct which a "reasonable woman" would consider
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employ-
ment and create an abusive work environment.10
In Ellison, a female Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent alleged
that a hostile working environment was created by a male co-worker
who made several lunch propositions and sent several letters stating his
deep-felt affection for her.11 Ellison ified a formal complaint alleging
sexual harassment after learning that she would have to continue to
work in the same office as the offending party. 2
After the IRS13 and EEOC14 rejected her complaint, Ellison filed
suit in federal district court.1 The district court granted the govern-
ment's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Ellison failed
to state a prima facie case.16 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded the case with instructions that hostile
10. Id. at 879. Other courts confronted with this issue have adopted the standard of
a "reasonable person." See infra note 32.
11. Kerry Ellison's co-worker, Sterling Gray sent her two love letters. The first
note read: "I cried over you last night and I'm totally drained today. I have never been
in such constant term oil [sic]. Thank you for talking with me. I could not stand to feel
your hatred for another day." Id. at 874. Gray sent Ellison an even more explicit letter
later that month. The letter stated in part, "I know that you are worth knowing with or
without sex .... I have enjoyed you so much over these past few months. Watching
you. Experiencing you from 0 so far away." Id. Gray's letter also promised that he
would write again "in the near future." Id.
12. 924 F.2d at 873-74. Fearful and uncertain of Gray's intentions, Ellison con-
tacted her supervisor. Id. at 874. Upon reading the first note, Ellison's supervisor,
Bonnie Miller, said "this is sexual harassment." Id. When notified of the second letter,
Miller instructed Gray that he must leave Ellison alone or one of them must be trans-
ferred. Appellee's Brief at 7, Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1991) (No. 89-
15248). Gray agreed to be transferred to another state office but after only three weeks
he sought to return. The IRS decided that Ellison's problem could be solved with a six-
month separation, and determined that Gray could return if he agreed to no longer
bother Ellison. 924 F.2d at 874.
13. Id. at 875. The Treasury Department rejected Ellison's complaint because it
believed that Gray's conduct did not constitute a "pattern or practice" of sexual harass-
ment within the EEOC regulations. Id.
14. Id. The EEOC affirmed the dismissal of the case on the ground that the IRS
had taken adequate steps to prevent recurrence. Id.
15. 924 F.2d at 875.
16. Id. The district court found that Ellison did not demonstrate that the "harass-
ment complained of was sufficiently pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive working environment." Appellee's Brief at 3, Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (No. 89-15248).
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environment claims should be determined from the perspective of a
"reasonable woman."17
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the objective of
Title VII is to provide equal employment opportunities."8 Yet, scant
legislative history exists that interprets the Act's prohibition against
"sex" discrimination. 9 On its face, Title VII evinces a congressional
intent to afford employees the right to work in an environment free
from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule or insult.20
After several lower court attempts to construe the boundaries of the
"sex" category of Title VII,2 the EEOC issued guidelines in 1980 that
17. 924 F.2d at 883. The government advanced two arguments relating to the
harassing party's conduct at the appellate level: (1) that her co-worker's conduct was
not sexual in nature, and (2) that his conduct was not so pervasive as to create a hostile
environment. Appellee's Brief at 16-17, Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)
(No. 87-4987). In rejecting the first argument, the court refrained from deciding
whether a cause of action for a sexually discriminatory work environment can be stated
when "the conduct in question is not sexual." Id. at 875 n.5. Cf. Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (conduct need not be overtly sexual in
nature); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); Hicks v.
Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987) (same); McKinney v. Dole,
765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same).
With respect to the court's analysis of the government's second argument, the appel-
late court found the district court's determination that Gray's conduct was "isolated
and genuinely trivial" unpersuasive. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 876. The government also
argued that prompt and effective action was taken by the IRS in this matter. Appellee's
Brief at 18-20, Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (No. 87-4987). See infra
notes 60-66 and the accompanying text for further discussion of the court's analysis.
18. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1982) (finding that an employer's
nondiscriminatorily-administered exam, which was a pass-fail barrier to employment
opportunity, created a disparate impact thus establishing a prima facie case of employ-
ment discrimination under § 703(a)(2) of Title VII) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
19. The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at
the last minute on the floor of the House. 110 CONG. REc. 2,577-84 (1964). The princi-
pal argument in opposition to the amendment was that "sex discrimination" does not
include problems sufficiently different from those of other types of discrimination such
that it ought to receive separate treatment. Id. at 2,577 (statement of Rep. Celler quot-
ing a letter from United States Department of Labor). Its proponents included a
number of Congressmen opposed to the Act, but hoping that the inclusion of "sex"
would highlight the absurdity of the legislation as a whole and contribute to its defeat.
Id. at 2,577-2,584 (remarks of Reps. Smith, Tuten, Andrews, and Rivers). For a thor-
ough discussion of proposed Civil Rights bills and subsequent debates, see Francis J.
Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. Rv. 431 (1965-66).
20. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
21. Initially, district courts generally rejected the notion that sexual harassment was
actionable under Title VII. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 212 (9th
Cir. 1979) (reversing lower court's finding that employer did not violate Title VII de-
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specified "sexual harassment" as a form of sex discrimination prohib-
ited by Title VII.22 By interpreting these guidelines and analogizing
them to cases of racial harassment in the workplace,2 3 courts eventu-
ally found sexual harassment environment cases to be actionable under
Title VII because they affected the conditions of employment.2 4
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court addressed the viability of
spite the plaintiff being discharged for refusing to engage in sex with supervisor); Tom-
kins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1049 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversing
lower court's finding that Title VII was not intended to provide a federal remedy for a
supervisor's sexually motivated, physical attack upon an employee). But see Williams v.
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976) (finding that the retaliatory actions of a
male supervisor, resulting from a female employee's refusal of his sexual advances, con-
stituted sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
These cases illustrate the district courts' hesitancy to actually extend Title VII liabil-
ity. At least one court feared a possible slippery slope where the result would be "a
potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made. . . sexually oriented advances
toward another. The only sure way an employer could avoid such charges would be to
have employees who were asexual." Come v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161,
163-64 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished opinion).
Instead, these courts saw sexual harassment in the workplace as a personal matter,
neither employment-related nor sex-based. See, e.g., Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163 (stating
that sexual harassment was not actionable because acts complained of were not suffi-
ciently tied to the workplace and the supervisor was acting upon a personal urge, not
the employer's policy); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124
(D.D.C. 1974) (attributing alleged discrimination not to plaintiff's sex, but to her re-
fusal to have sexual relations with her supervisor, which resulted in an "inharmonious
personal relationship"), rev'd sub nom., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991). See supra note 4 and accompanying text dis-
cussing the adoption of the EEOC's guidelines on sexual harassment. The EEOC sexual
harassment guidelines state that "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fa-
vors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harass-
ment" when such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment. Id.
23. The hostile work environment theory was first introduced and accepted in Rog-
ers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). The
Rogers court concluded that the employer's policy of racially segregating patients was
actionable under Title VII even though it was not directly aimed at the employee, a
member of a minority race. Id. at 241.
24. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
workplace pervaded with sexual innuendos becomes a discriminatory condition of em-
ployment); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982) (same);
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that sexually stereo-
typed insults and sexual advances affected condition of employment); Zabkowicz v.
West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784-85 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (noting that offensive lan-
guage and sexually-oriented drawings created damaging conditions of employment).
1992]
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"hostile environment" sexual harassment claims for the first time in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.2 The Court determined that a hostile
environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment created a
cause of action under Title VII.26 The Court rejected the notion that
all workplace conduct which may be described as harassment consti-
tutes a violation of Title VII. 27 Instead, the Court held that an action
for sexual harassment under Title VII requires conduct "sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment
and create an abusive working environment."2 Thus, the Meritor
Court determined that the supervisor's repeated sexual advances and
demands for sexual activity were sufficient to state a claim for "hostile
environment" sexual harassment.29
Since the Meritor Court failed to articulate a standard of assessment
to be used,30 lower courts have determined that the sufficiently perva-
25. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
26. Id. at 65-67. The EEOC Guidelines persuaded the Court in reaching its conclu-
sion. Id. at 65. See supra notes 4 and 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
EEOC Guidelines. Moreover, cases recognizing a cause of action under Title VII for
harassment based on race also influenced the Court. 477 U.S. at 66. See also supra note
23-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases that the Court relied on in reach-
ing its decision.
27. 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)). The
courts in Meritor and Rogers agreed that a mere utterance of an epithet that offends an
employee would not sufficiently effect the conditions of employment. Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 67 and Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
28. 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)).
29. Ia at 67. The plaintiff initially rejected her employer's advances and demands
for sexual activity but later acceded out of fear for her job. Id. at 60. The plaintiff
alleged that her supervisor made sexual advances towards her during and after work
hours, followed her into the ladies' restroom, fondled her in front of other employees,
exposed himself to her and had sex with her, including forcible rape, forty or fifty times.
Id
30. In Meritor, the Court merely stated that the pervasive nature of the harassment,
along with the criminal conduct involved, made the allegations sufficient to state a claim
of hostile environment sexual harassment. Id. at 67. The Court's instructions directed
the fact finder to assess whether the advances, either physical gestures or verbal expres-
sions, were "unwelcome." Id. at 68. The Court also suggested that the trier of fact base
their determination of whether harassment exists "in light of 'the record as a whole' and
on 'the totality of circumstances.'" Id. at 69 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(b) (1985)).
Other cases that have found the presence of a "hostile environment" actionable as
sexual harassment have also involved situations of marked hostility and abuse of a
clearly exploitable or humiliating nature. See, eg., Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d
746, 750 (8th Cir. 1986) (rape); Egger v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union, 644
F. Supp. 795, 797-98 n.3 (D. Mass. 1986) (involving an alleged hostile environment
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sive or severe test demands a factual inquiry judged by an objective
standard.31 One line of authority holds that a "reasonable person" test
should be employed in hostile environment cases.32 Another line of
authority proffers a "reasonable woman" standard for determining
whether a hostile environment has been created.33 Due to the split in
where physical contact, threats, demeaning pranks and comments on plaintiff's chest
size, comments about her sex life, graphic description of male employees' sex lives in
front of her, showing plaintiff pornographic books and asking her to participate in a
sexually explicit home video transpired in a two to three week period); Moffett v. Gene
B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 270 (N.D. Ind. 1985) ("regular, almost daily exposure
to terms such as 'stupid cunt', 'whore', 'bitch' and 'nigger lover' over the course of six or
seven months").
31. For an in-depth analysis of the reasonableness standard see Nancy S.
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sex-
ual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1218 (1990) (stating that the use of a reasona-
bleness standard "can create a false sense of security, lulling one into believing that a
result is inherently fair regardless of its specific content, and reinforcing the idea that
legal analysis can be neutral and objective"). See also Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in
the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41,
57-58 (suggesting that the application of objective standards have negative mainstream-
ing effects).
32. See, eg., Rose v. Figgie Int'l, 919 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1990) (unpublished opin-
ion) (affirming the district court's perspective of a reasonable person's reaction to a
similar environment); Dabish v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 902 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1990)
(unpublished opinion) (conduct is to be gauged by how a reasonable person would react,
regardless of how the plaintiff herself would react); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 193 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that activity must interfere with a
reasonable person's work performance or seriously affect a reasonable person's psycho-
logical well-being); King v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (con-
duct must "adversely affect both a reasonable person and the particular plaintiff
bringing an action" (quoting Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir.
1989))); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989) (same); Waltman v.
International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 476 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that court must
determine whether a reasonable person would feel that the environment was hostile);
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that trier of
fact must adopt the perspective of a reasonable person's reaction); cf. Shrout v. Black
Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774, 781 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (stating that trier of fact must
adopt the perspective of a reasonable employee).
33. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
prima facie case of hostile environment exists when plaintiff alleges conduct that a rea-
sonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive as to change the condi-
tions of employment and create an abusive working atmosphere); Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that a court should consider
all elements to see if they produce a sexually hostile environment that would detrimen-
tally affect a woman of reasonable sensibilities); Tindall v. Housing Auth., 762 F. Supp.
259, 262 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (suggesting that, under many circumstances, a reasonable
woman would be justified in viewing sexual jokes and cartoons as harassment); Robin-
son v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding
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the circuits, the applicable legal standard remains indeterminate.
An early Sixth Circuit case, Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,34 illus-
trates the application of the "reasonable person" standard within the
context of sexual harassment claims. In Rabidue, a female manage-
ment employee sued Osceola Refining Company for sexual harass-
ment.35 She claimed the company refused to halt the display of
pornographic posters, as well as the continuous anti-female obscenities
directed at her and other women by a co-worker.36 The court adopted
the perspective of "a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environ-
ment under essentially like or similar circumstances."37 In applying
this standard, the Rabidue court found that the co-worker's conduct
was merely de minimis and had not unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff's work environment.38 The court characterized the conduct
that the objective standard asks whether a reasonable woman would perceive an abusive
working environment); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs., 669 F. Supp. 569, 572 (W.D.N.Y.
1987) (stating that a reasonable woman must find the hostile environment intolerable);
Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587, 605 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (stating that sexual har-
assment must "be so significant a factor that the average female employee would find
that her overall work performance is substantially and adversely effected by the con-
duct").
One reason for the differing approaches taken by the courts has been the realization
that men and women have different perceptions on what constitutes offensive behavior.
For a discussion on this point, see Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Expe-
rience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 52 n.56 (1990). See also BAR-
BARA A. GUrEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 95-104 (1985) (discussing the differing
attitudes of men and women about sex at work).
34. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
35. Id. at 615.
36. Id. The conduct of which Rabidue complained was harsh and explicit. One of
the posters displayed at the plant depicted a prone woman with a golf ball on her
breasts, straddled by a man holding a golf club and yelling "fore." Id. at 624 (Keith, J.,
dissenting). The comments that her co-worker directed at her and her fellow female
workers included such epithets as "whores," "cunt," and "pussy." Id.
37. Id. at 620. The Sixth Circuit actually introduced a dual standard which re-
quires a combination of objective and subjective inquiries. Id. The first part of the
adopted test requires plaintiffs to prove "that the defendant's conduct would have inter-
fered with a reasonable individual's work performance and would have affected seri-
ously the psychological well-being of a reasonable employee." Id. The second prong
requires the plaintiff "to demonstrate that she was actually offended by the defendant's
conduct and that she suffered some degree of injury as a result of the abusive and hostile
work environment." Id. Therefore, the presence of actionable sexual harassment de-
pends upon the personality of the plaintiff within the prevailing work environment, and
must be analyzed on an ad hoc basis. Id
38. Id. at 622. But see infra notes 54-59 for a discussion of Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that sexually explicit pinups
and sexual remarks create a sexually hostile environment). See also Bennett v. Corroon
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as a legitimate expression of the cultural norms of workers at the plant
and suggested that the prevailing depictions of women in the media
indicated that such conduct was not unreasonably offensive.39
Several other circuits have followed the Rabidue decision and have
applied the "reasonable person" standard in hostile environment sexual
harassment cases.' For instance, in Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.,41 an
industrial nurse filed suit for sexual harassment under Title VII.4 2 The
Seventh Circuit adopted Rabidue's "reasonable person" test.43 After
analyzing how a reasonable person would have reacted under similar
circumstances, the Brooms court found that the supervisor's repeated
instances of sexual innuendos and advances would have interfered with
and effected a reasonable individual's work performance and psycho-
logical well-being."
& Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988) (posting of pornographic cartoons
serve as evidence of a hostile environment).
In dissent, Judge Keith advocated the use of a reasonable woman (or reasonable vic-
tim) standard. 805 F.2d at 627 (Keith, J., dissenting). Keith felt the majority's ap-
proach enforced an essentially male viewpoint which fails to recognize women's
differing views of appropriate sexual conduct. Id. at 626.
39. 805 F.2d at 622. The court appeared to rely on two arguments in concluding
that the conduct had not been unreasonably offensive. First, that the court should not
interpret Title VII to enforce changes in the working class culture, and should not inter-
fere with that environment. d. at 620-22. Second, that the working environment could
not be unreasonably offensive because it did not differ from the rest of society. Id. at
622. See Ehrenreich, supra note 31, at 1196-1210 (discussing these arguments and how
each ignores or minimizes the conflict between men's and women's viewpoints and thus
only "solves" the problem presented by avoiding it).
40. The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have adopted the "reason-
able person" standard. See supra note 32 for illustrative cases.
41. 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989).
42. Id. at 417. The alleged harassment included numerous racial and sexual re-
marks as well as sexual advances. Id. at 416. One incident included a supervisor show-
ing her a pornographic photo depicting an interracial act of sodomy and telling her that
the photo showed the "talent" of a black woman. Id. at 417.
43. Id. at 419. Like the Rabidue court, the Seventh Circuit adopted a dual stan-
dard, which would account for the likely effect of a defendant's conduct upon a reason-
able person's ability to perform his or her work and upon his or her well-being, as well
as the actual effect upon the particular plaintiff. Id See also Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff
Futures Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1990) (using the Brooms court's dual stan-
dard approach to conclude that, regardless of the court's view that a hostile work envi-
ronment was created, the plaintiff could not recover because she failed to prove an
injury resulting from the conduct); cf Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264,
1271-72 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying the Brooms court's dual standard approach to a racial
harassment claim).
44. 881 F.2d at 420 (quoting Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620). Although the lower court
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While some courts adhere to the "reasonable person" standard,
other courts have found the perspective of a "reasonable woman" more
accurate.45 The Third Circuit articulated such a view in Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia.46 In Andrews, two female employees of the city
police department alleged sexual harassment by their co-workers and
supervisors.' The court held that one of the elements of a successful
hostile environment sexual harassment claim is a determination that
the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable victim of the
same sex.48 The court believed that employing a reasonable woman
standard better suited the aim of eradicating the stereotypes and degra-
dation that undermine equal employment opportunity.49 The Andrews
court remanded the case but attempted to clarify the factors to be con-
sidered by the lower court.50 To constitute impermissible discrimina-
tion, the offensive conduct need not include sexual overtones in every
instance, nor does each incident need to be sufficiently severe harass-
ment that detrimentally affects female employees.51 Yet, the consistent
use of negative and insulting terms relating to women, along with the
posting of pornographic pictures, may evince a hostile environment.
52
did not explicitly address the objective component of the Rabidue test, the court of
appeals believed that the answer to the objective inquiry was implicit in the district
court's holding. Id. at 419.
45. See supra note 33 for cases that have applied a "reasonable woman" standard.
See also Note, supra note 6, at 1459 (arguing that courts should examine claims from
the perspective of the reasonable victim).
46. 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
47. ia at 1471. The harassing conditions complained of included abusive language,
demeaning pornographic photos, destruction of property and work product, and anony-
mous phone calls. Id. at 1472-75.
48. Id. at 1482. The court pointed out that analysis of a claim included both a
subjective and an objective standard. Id. at 1483. The former focuses on whether the
alleged discrimination injured the particular plaintiff. Id. While the more critical latter
standard determines whether a sexually hostile work environment exists. Id.
49. Id. (citing Note, supra note 6, at 1455).
50. 895 F.2d at 1485-86. The court also noted that the lower court should view the
totality of the circumstances when making its decision. Id. at 1484. In so doing, the
fact finder should look not only to the frequency of the incidents, but also to their
gravity as well. Id.
51. Id. at 1485. See supra note 17 for cases where conduct toward women which
was not sexually explicit still resulted in a hostile environment.
52. 895 F.2d at 1485. The court realized the impracticality of holding an employer
accountable for every sexist incident, but found that requiring employers to take ade-
quate measures to prevent an atmosphere of sexism would not be unreasonable. Id. at
1486. See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1531 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) ("An employer escapes liability for isolated and infrequent slurs and misogy-
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Although men may believe that these actions are innocent, a reason-
able woman exposed to that type of environment might feel
otherwise.
53
More recently, the district court in Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards 54 employed the "reasonable woman" standard.5" In Robinson, a
female shipyard employee brought an action alleging that defendants
created and encouraged a sexually hostile work environment by per-
mitting the presence of sexually explicit pinups of women, as well as
sexual jokes and remarks.56 The court stated that the proper inquiry
addresses whether a reasonable person of plaintiff's sex, a reasonable
woman, would perceive her workplace as an abusive environment.57
The court rejected the defendant's reliance on Rabidue and reiterated
the need to examine the totality of circumstances.58 In this context,
pornography in the workplace communicates a negative message to
nist behaviors because even a reasonably prudent employer cannot exercise sufficient
control over the workplace to put an end to such conduct, [yet] an employer incurs
liability when harassing behavior happens frequently enough that the employer can take
steps to halt it."); cf Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421 (7th Cir.
1986) (stating that it is difficult "to see how an isolated racial slur could... be signifi-
cant enough ... to count as employment discrimination," but that an employer may be
liable for failing to "take reasonable steps to prevent a barrage of racist acts, epithets,
and threats").
53. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486.
54. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
55. Id. at 1524-27.
56. Id. at 1493-1502. Sexist propaganda and conduct were rampant at the shipyard.
Id. Pictures of nude women appeared throughout the workplace in the form of
magazines, plaques, and photographs torn from magazines and affixed to the wall. Id.
In fact, these pictures were so pervasive that plaintiff herself could not recount every
example. Id. at 1495.
57. Id. at 1524. This test, according to the court, involves looking at the severity
and pervasiveness of the misconduct. Id. See, e.g., King v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d
533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that repeated verbal assaults, touchings, and unwel-
come advances adversely affected plaintiff); Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890
F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that even though period of sexual harassment was
not extensive, where supervisor made constant propositions to employee during two
week period, such activity created a hostile work environment); Vermett v. Hough, 627
F. Supp. 587, 605-06 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (noting that "[o]rdinarily more than one iso-
lated incident of sexually offensive conduct must have occurred," yet "the requirement
for repeated exposure will vary inversely with the severity of the offensiveness of the
incidents").
58. 760 F. Supp. at 1526-27. The court concluded that the "social context" argu-
ment authorizes a pre-existing work situation that deters women, conflicting with the
aims of Title VII. Id. at 1526. See supra note 39 and accompanying text for the
Rabidue court's "social context" view.
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women which men are less likely to perceive, thus undermining work-
place equality and creating a hostile environment.59
Ellison v. Brady ' presented the Ninth Circuit with an opportunity
to determine what standard to apply in a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim under Title VII. The Ellison court rejected the "rea-
sonable person" standard and concluded instead that the presence of a
hostile environment should be judged from the perspective of the vic-
tim. 61 Under the court's analysis, a woman states a prima facie case of
hostile environment sexual harassment by alleging conduct that a rea-
sonable woman would consider "sufficiently severe or pervasive" as to
create a hostile work environment.62
The court determined that a "reasonable person" standard was erro-
neous because it does not permit analysis of the differing perspectives
59. Id. at 1526 (citing Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transfor-
mation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1212 n.l18 (1989)). Porno-
graphic material in the workplace "may communicate that women should be the objects
of sexual aggression, that they are submissive slaves to male desires, or that their most
salient and desirable attributes are sexual." Id. These views detract from the image
most women would like to project. Id. See also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895
F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that obscene language and pornography could be
regarded as offensive to women who seek to deal with fellow employees with profes-
sional dignity) (quoting Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir.
1988)); Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 1,
15 (1990) ("[S]exist speech reflects and reinforces a belief that women are sex objects,
rather than productive and equal co-workers."). But see Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co.,
805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that sexually oriented posters have only a
de minimis effect).
60. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 878. The court did not explicitly repudiate the Rabidue court's reason-
able person standard. Rather, it relied on the EEOC Compliance Manual for support.
Id. (courts "should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of
acceptable behavior") (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 615, 3112, C at
3242 (1988)). However, the opinion inaccurately cites to King v. Board of Regents, 898
F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990). King applied the Brooms test of using both objective and
subjective queries. 898 F.2d at 537. King held that "in order to find discrimination, the
court must conclude that the conduct would adversely affect both a reasonable person
and the ... [plaintiff herself]." Id. at 537. See generally Marlisa Vinciguerra, Note, The
Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98
YALE L.J. 1717, 1737-38 (1989) ("[Ihe standards for assessing women's psychological
harm due to harassment must begin to reflect women's sensitivity to behavior once con-
doned as acceptable.").
62. 924 F.2d at 879. The court also realized that when a claim is brought by a male




of men and women.63 Because the "reasonable person" standard tends
to favor a male perspective and systematically ignore the experiences of
women, the court found the standard inappropriate." The court con-
cluded that a "reasonable person" standard risked reinforcing the pre-
vailing level of discrimination, which would undermine the objectives
of Title VII.65 By acknowledging the effects of sexual harassment on a
reasonable woman, women are able to participate in the workplace "on
an equal footing with men." 66
In dissent, Judge Stephens found the term "reasonable woman," as
used by the majority, to be ambiguous and therefore inadequate.67
First, Stephens argued that Congress intended Title VII to provide for
equal treatment in the area of civil rights.68 Stephens believed that a
gender-based standard would undermine the Act's goal of creating a
gender-neutral workplace.69 Second, if the courts were to adopt a
"reasonable woman" standard, Stephens concluded that it would alien-
ate claims brought by men, who are also targets of harassment.70 Fi-
nally, Judge Stephens found the majority's premise that men and
women perceive their environments differently to be unsubstantiated.71
Accordingly, the dissent would disregard the "reasonable woman"
63. Id. at 878. The court stated, "[c]onduct that many men consider unobjection-
able may offend many women." Id.
64. Id. at 879. The court acknowledged that women have a stronger incentive to be
concerned with hostile sexual behavior because they are disproportionately the victims
of rape and sexual assault. Id. Moreover, the court stated that "[m]en... may view
sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or the un-
derlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive." Id.
65. Id. at 880-81. The court noted that "Congress did not enact Title VII to codify
prevailing sexist prejudices." Id. at 881.
66. 924 F.2d at 879. The court rejected the notion that its newly adopted standard
would provide a higher level of protection for women than men. Id. In addition, the
court considered the concerns of employers, reasoning that the application of the "rea-
sonable woman" standard would "shield employers from having to accommodate the
idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hypersensitive employee." Id.
67. Id. at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Stephens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. The dissent also pointed out that "the Supreme Court has shown a prefer-
ence against systems that are not gender or race neutral." Id (citing City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
70. 924 F.2d at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting). The dissent realized that cases are
more frequently brought by women, but men are also entitled to relief under Title VII.
Id.
71. Id. The dissent questioned the majority's rationale since they cited no evidence
that a man cannot see what a woman sees through her eyes. Id
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standard and propose a gender-neutral standard.72
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Ellison properly declined to follow
the "reasonable person" approach and correctly advocated a "reason-
able woman" standard. A work environment free from discriminatory
conduct, harassment, and the perpetuation of stereotypes accomplishes
the objective of Title VII.73 The first step toward fulfilling this objec-
tive is recognizing that men and women hold differing perspectives on
what constitutes sexual harassment.74 The Ellison court realized this
lack of social consensus and, as a result, set forth a standard that at-
tempts to protect women from the offensiveness resulting from the di-
verse perceptions of males and females on what is appropriate
conduct.75
Courts have been reluctant to penalize conduct of less than an egre-
gious nature.76 Nevertheless, a vast grey area of potentially offensive,
nonegregious conduct remains. Meanwhile, relations in the workplace
may become strained because men fear that their behavior might offend
a sensitive woman and result in a lawsuit. To remedy these concerns
the "reasonable woman" standard would provide guidance to the
courts, extending the range of unacceptable conduct while also protect-
ing an employer from the "hypersensitive" employee.77
72. Id. at 884-85. The dissent suggested gender neutral terms like "victim," "tar-
get," or "person." Ia at 884. But see Pollack, supra note 33, at 53 (suggesting that
"[t]here may be no gender-neutral norms or ways to interpret those norms").
73. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text explaining the goal of Title VII.
74. One study found that the biggest discrepancy between men and women in their
attitudes toward workplace sex was on the question whether the respondent would feel
"flattered" if asked to have sex: 67.2% of the men, as compared to 16.8% of the wo-
men, responded that they would be flattered, while 15% of the men, and 62.8% of the
women, reported that they would be insulted. GUTEK, supra note 33, at 96. See also
CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 163 (1979)
("Men who sexually harass women are commonly dumbfounded that the women resent
it.... ."); Pollack, supra note 33, at 52 ("[Mluch of the behavior that women find offen-
sive is behavior that is accepted as normal heterosexual behavior by men."). The dis-
sent in Rabidue also supported this proposition, see supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
75. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text explaining the court's reasoning.
See also Note, supra note 6, at 1459 for discussion in support of this analysis.
76. See supra note 30 for illustrative cases.
77. See supra note 66 discussing the "hypersensitive employee" problem. Cf. Note,
supra note 6, at 1459 ("By adopting the woman's point of view as the norm, the courts




Sexual harassment in the workplace remains a pervasive problem.78
By adopting a victim-oriented approach, perhaps males will become
more conscious of the possible effects of unwelcome sexual harassment,
and change their conduct accordingly.7 9 The Ellison court presents a
thorough analysis in support of a victim's perspective approach 0 and,
fortunately, numerous other courts have adopted this standard as
well.81
Work places across the country may have to undergo serious reform
as a result of Ellison and the other "reasonable victim" cases. Certain
long-standing and common workplace conduct may have to change if
the "reasonable woman" standard receives uniform acceptance. Con-
duct that once seemed harmless and purely in jest from the male per-
spective now may be susceptible to court action. Accordingly, the
Ellison court's "reasonable woman" standard better comports with the
objectives of Title VII and moves toward eliminating sexual harass-
ment in the workplace. 82
Lynne A. Reinders*
78. In one government study, 42% of the women respondents reported being sub-
jected to some form of "sexual harassment" between May of 1978 and May of 1980 at
an estimated cost to the federal government of $189 million (cost includes males who
have been sexually harassed). UNITED STATES MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 36 (1981).
The figures were roughly the same in a 1987 survey, but the costs over a two-year period
rose to $267 million. UNITED STATES MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 39 (1988). Other surveys
found that anywhere from 36 to 53 percent of the women questioned thought of them-
selves as victims. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 822 n.28 (1991).
79. For discussion on the effects of sexual harassment, see Fran Sepler, Sexual Har-
assment: From Protective Response To Proactive Prevention, 11 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
PoL'Y 61, 66-68 (1990).
80. But cf. Ehrenreich, supra note 31, at 1218 (by failing to address issues of race
and class, the reasonable woman standard "may perpetuate existing inequities based on
those factors in the same way that the reasonable person standard does when it fails to
consider the women's point of view"); Finley, supra note 31, at 63-64 (concluding that
the reasonable woman standard merely replaces one stereotype with another).
81. See supra notes 33, 45-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of other cases
which follow this approach.
82. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-81 (9th Cir. 1991). See supra notes 61-66
and accompanying text discussing the court's rationale.
* J.D. 1993, Washington University.
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CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE
PRESS AND ITS SOURCES: COHEN v.
COWLES MEDIA CO., 111 S. Ct. 2513
(1991)
The First Amendment to the Constitution' protects the press against
state common law causes of action2 that directly burden the publica-
tion of truthful information.3 The United States Supreme Court sup-
ports an unfettered press4 and criticizes any state-imposed sanctions on
the exercise of free speech and press rights.5 However, this constitu-
tional protection is not absolute.6 The First Amendment does not
shield the press from laws of general application7 even if they burden
1. The First Amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. A state private common law cause of action is defined as a body of law that is
developed through judicial decisions, as distinguished from legislative enactments.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (6th ed. 1990).
3. It is unlawful for the state to punish a newspaper that legally obtains and pub-
lishes truthful information, "absent a need to further a state interest of the highest or-
der." Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). A basic purpose of
the First Amendment is to limit a state's power to penalize the press for printing the
truth. See Michael Dicke, Note, Promises and the Pres" First Amendment Limitations
on News Source Recovery for Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV.
1553, 1570 (1989).
4. Dicke, supra note 3, at 1560-62.
5. Id. at 1562. See infra note 26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
strict balancing test used by the Supreme Court to restrict limitations on the press' First
Amendment rights.
6. Dicke, supra note 3, at 1557. The Court's consistent recognition of tort actions
against the press indicates that there is no absolute privilege to publish all true informa-
tion. Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-Source
Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 609, 656-57 (1991).
7. A law of general application is one that does not single out or target the press,
but rather is applicable to all state citizens' daily transactions. Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., Ill S. Ct. 2513, 2515 (1991). Traditionally, the press has been subject to laws of
general application, including breach of privacy, trespass and unfair competition as well
as federal antitrust and labor laws. See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103,
132 (1937) (holding that petitioner's business was not immune from regulation under
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speech incidentally.8 In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ,9 the United States
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not bar a promis-
sory estoppel claim against a newspaper that breached its promise of
confidentiality to an informant, even if liability would constrain the
newspaper's ability to gather and report the news.10
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., petitioner alleged that respondent
newspapers1" breached their confidentiality agreement, causing him to
§ 7 of the National Labor Relations Act simply because it was an agency of the press).
See also Levi, supra note 6, at 657 n.163.
8. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518. For a well-established line of cases holding that gen-
eral applicability laws do not violate the First Amendment, see infra note 28. See also
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977) (holding
that the press may not publish a performer's entire act without his consent unless state
law permits the press to do so under such circumstances); Citizen Publishing Co. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (stating that the First Amendment does not bar
the press from violating antitrust laws); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 192-94 (1946) (stating that the Fair Labor Standards Act, as applied to the
business of distributing and publishing newspapers, does not violate First Amendment);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (noting that the First Amend-
ment does not preclude application of antitrust laws).
9. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
10. Id at 2519. The Court determined that promissory estoppel is a law of general
application, rather than one aimed at the contents of a press publication. Id. at 2518-19.
As of 1990, only six other cases involving breach of reporter's confidentiality agree-
ments had been reported. See Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp.
1289, 1298 (1. Minn. 1990) (stating that a confidentiality agreement between reporter
and source had to specify the unpublishable information to constitute a waiver of the
reporter's First Amendment rights), aff'd in part, 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991); Huskey
v. National Broadcasting Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (N.D. IM. 1986) (holding that
the media breached a contract with a federal penitentiary not to film inmates without
their consent); Cullen v. Grove Press, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(ruling in favor of film maker who filmed conditions at a state correctional institution
because the plaintiff's claim of invasion of privacy was inconsistent with .defendant's
First Amendment rights); Doe v. American Broadcasting Cos., 543 N.Y.S.2d 455, 455-
456 (N.Y. App. Div.) (denying rape victim's claim of negligent and intentional infliction
of emotional distress arising from a television interview that assured anonymity, yet
resulted in recognition), appeal dismissed, 549 N.E.2d 480 (1989); Virelli v. Goodson-
Todman Enterprises, 536 N.Y.S.2d 571, 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (noting that despite
the reporter breaking a promise of anonymity to his source, the media is not liable for
ordinary negligence when reporting a matter of public concern); Bindrim v. Mitchell,
155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. Ct. App.) (holding that a contract between a therapist and
patient preventing the patient from writing a story about her therapy was not enforcea-
ble), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
11. The respondents are the publishers, not the individual reporters, of the St. Paul
Pioneer Press Dispatch and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune, both Minnesota corpora-
tions. Cohen, II S. Ct. at 2516.
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lose his job.12 Relying on a promise of anonymity,13 Cohen gave docu-
ments relating to one of the gubernatorial candidates in an upcoming
election to reporters from two newspapers.14 Subsequently, respon-
dents broke their promise by publicly identifying Cohen as the anony-
mous source. 15  Cohen sued both papers for fraudulent
misrepresentation and breach of contract.1 6 The trial court ruled that
although petitioner alleged sufficient state action to implicate the First
Amendment, the Amendment did not bar his claims17 and the jury
awarded Cohen both compensatory and punitive damages.18 The Min-
nesota Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, conclud-
ing that petitioner failed to establish a misrepresentation claim.1 9 On
appeal, a divided Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
judgement in favor of Cohen, holding that the parties had not estab-
lished a legal contract.2" The court further held that the First Amend-
12. Petitioner Dan Cohen was the director of public relations for the advertising
agency representing the Independent-Republican gubernatorial candidate in the 1982
Minnesota election. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989). The advertising agency fired the petitioner the same day respondents published
Cohen's name as a source for a story concerning the candidate. Id. at 253.
13. Cohen made it explicitly clear to the reporters that he would provide the infor-
mation only on the condition that his identity remain anonymous. Id. at 252. Both
reporters agreed to fulfill this promise. Id.
14. Id. One week before the election, Cohen obtained two public court records
concerning Marlene Johnson, the Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor. Id.
The records indicated that Johnson had been charged in 1969 for unlawful assembly
and convicted in 1970 for petit theft. Both counts were eventually dismissed. Id.
15. Id. at 253.
16. 445 N.W.2d at 254.
17. Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the application of state
rules of law to restrict First Amendment freedom constitutes "state action" under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., Ill S. CL 2513, 2517 (1991)
(citing New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964)). See also Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (noting that action of state courts and judicial officers in
their official capacities is state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
18. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The
jury granted Cohen $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive dam-
ages. Id.
19. Id. at 260, 262. Without a misrepresentation claim, the court could not justify
awarding Cohen punitive damages. Id. at 260.
20. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990). The court
pointed out that although the press had an ethical duty to keep its confidentiality agree-
ment, no legal duty existed. Id.
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ment barred Cohen from maintaining a promissory estoppel claim.21
The United States Supreme Court reversed, declaring that Cohen could
maintain a cause of action under Minnesota law on a promissory estop-
pel theory.
22
Freedom of the press is a fundamental and compelling national in-
terest.23 State laws which effectively control the content of the media's
publications have been overwhelmingly struck down.24 Absent some
21. Id. at 203-05. The Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner
could maintain a promissory estoppel action under general Minnesota law. Id.
The three elements of promissory estoppel are: (1) an unambiguous promise; (2) an
expectation of induced action or reliance by the promisee; and (3) injustice that can only
be avoided by enforcing the promise. Id. at 203-04. The court held that although this
case satisfied the first two criteria, it was unwilling to conclude that injustice could be
avoided only by enforcing the promise. Id. at 204. By implementing a balancing test
the Court found that the constitutional rights of the free press outweighed the common
law interest in protecting a promise of confidentiality. Id. at 205. Thus, the court con-
cluded that a promissory estoppel theory would violate the respondent's First Amend-
ment rights. Id.
22. Cohen, I11 S. Ct. at 2518-20. The Court concluded that the First Amendment
does not confer a constitutional right on the press to disregard promises that would
otherwise be enforced under state law. Id. at 2519.
23. Kurt Hirsch, Note, Throwing the Book at Revelations: First Amendment Impli-
cations of Enforcing Reporters' Promises, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 161, 171
(1991).
24. See, eg., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan,
the Supreme Court "costitutionalized" the law of defamation in order to protect the
press' First Amendment rights. Id. at 283. Sullivan introduced the actual malice stan-
dard to libel law. Under the standard, persons requesting damages for libel must prove
that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the state-
ment was false or made with reckless disregard of its truthfulness. Id. at 279-80. This
landmark case made a drastic impact on tort remedies and expanded First Amendment
protections. See Hirsch, supra note 23, at 166-67. The case prompted further inquiry
by the Court into the category of plaintiffs that are subject to the actual malice standard
and the type of showing that is necessary to satisfy the new test. Id.
Additionally, the Constitution delimits a state's power to infringe upon the media's
"breathing space." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72. The Court explained in a subsequent
case that:
Some tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited
press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury... In our continuing
effort to define the proper accommodation between these competing concerns, we
have been especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of speech and press that
"breathing space" essential to their fruitful exercise. To that end this Court has
extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974)(citations omitted). See also
Dicke, supra note 3, at 1560 (noting the Supreme Court's recent sensitivity to "the
chilling effect private common-law causes of action can have on the exercise of free
speech and press rights").
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higher state interest, a common law cause of action regulating the con-
tent of speech cannot predominate25 over First Amendment free-
doms.2 6 However, the First Amendment does not always bar state
restraints on the media's conduct. 27 The press should not be granted
special immunity from state laws of general application. 28 Because
such laws of generality do not single out the press, they do not offend
the First Amendment.2 9
25. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)(holding that absent
a legitimate and compelling state interest, the constitutional rights of the press
predominate). See also, Sally A. Specht, Comment, The Wavering, Unpredictable Line
Between "Speech" and Conduct The Fate of Expressive Conduct After Young v. New
York City Transit Authority, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), 40 WASH. U. J. URn. &
CONTEMP. L., 173, 176 (1991) ("Absent a compelling governmental interest, freedom of
expression must predominate.").
26. The Supreme Court has adopted a "compelling state interest" balancing test to
determine whether state action that has adverse effects on speech violates the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536-39 (1989) (noting that
the Florida statute which makes it unlawful to print or publish the name of a rape
victim violates press' First Amendment rights); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Min-
nesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582 (1988) (a burden on First Amendment
rights "cannot stand unless the burden is necessary to achieve an overriding governmen-
tal interest") cited with approval in, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 256
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979)
(holding that the state may not punish the publication of lawfully obtained information
except when it is necessary to further a substantial state interest); Landmark Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42 (1978) (stating that the importance of
reporting governmental affairs outweighs a state statute imposing criminal sanctions for
breaching confidentiality of proceedings); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 496 (1975) (holding that state cannot impose sanctions on press for publishing rape
victim's name when information is open to public inspection).
The Supreme Court has also held that the First Amendment imposes limitations on
other common law causes of action, such as defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (stating
that freedom to publish advertisement parody trumps public figure's interest in reputa-
tion when false statement is made without actual malice or reckless disregard); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-85 (1964) (balancing the interests pro-
tected by defamation law against public interest served by a free press); see also Dicke,
supra note 3, at 1560-62 for further discussion of the Court's focus on the chilling effect
on free speech resulting from remedies for false statements.
27. This is true especially when a newspaper voluntarily assumes the restraint or
unlawfully obtains the information. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 204 n.6.
28. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91
(1972) (First Amendment does not relieve the press from the obligations that all citizens
have to respond to a grand jury subpoena); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103,
132-33 (1937) ("The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the appli-
cation of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of
others.").
29. Dicke, supra note 3, at 1560.
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The Supreme Court first became sensitive to the tension between
common law causes of action and the exercise of free speech and press
rights in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 30 In Sullivan, the Court held
that state enforcement of traditional strict liability defamation laws vi-
olated the First Amendment rights of the press.31 The court strength-
ened the defamation standard by requiring the plaintiff to prove that
the statement was made with actual malice.3 2 By constitutionalizing
defamation law,33 the Court hoped to give the press the proper
"breathing space" 34 to investigate news without fear of reprisal from
libel suits.3 5 The Court formulated a balancing test and held that the
public interest served by a free press outweighed the interests protected
by the law of defamation.36
The Supreme Court applied the Sullivan malice standard in Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell37 by limiting actions for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.38 The Court in Falwell ruled against a public figure
defamed in an advertising parody, holding that damages were unwar-
ranted where the false statement was made without actual malice.39
The Court reasoned that, as long as the speech can be interpreted as
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. Id. at 283. Under the common law of defamation, one who published false and
defamatory material was strictly liable for damages, even without proof of actual harm.
RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 559 (1938).
32. 376 U.S. at 279-80. See supra note 24 for a discussion of the new standard.
33. See supra note 24 for a discussion of constitutionalizing defamation law.
34. 376 U.S. at 271-72.
35. Id. See also Hirsch, supra note 23, at 167 (noting that the Supreme Court
hoped to give the press space to investigate and report without fear of large damage
awards).
36. 376 U.S. at 284-85. Traditional strict liability standard may possibly lead to
media self-censorship. See Dicke, supra note 3, at 1576; see also Note, The Rights of the
Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1516 n.62 (1974)
(explaining that a fear of sanctions would discourage the press from acting on constitu-
tional guarantees).
37. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
38. Id. at 56. To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising from advertisement parody, the plaintiff had to meet the Sullivan actual malice
standard. Id.
39. 485 U.S. at 56. Respondent, a well-known and outspoken minister, was por-
trayed in a magazine advertisement as a drunk and unscrupulous individual. Id. at 48.
Respondent filed a diversity action against the magazine and publisher to recover dam-
ages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at
48-49. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment for respondent. Id. at
57.
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stating actual facts without malice, the state's interest in protecting its
citizens from emotional distress does not outweigh the critical First
Amendment protection to speech.' Without meeting this require-
ment, the Court could not justify stifling the free flow of information
on matters of public interest and concern.4'
The Supreme Court continues to apply the balancing test enunciated
in Sullivan.42 For example, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,43
respondent newspapers revealed the name of a juvenile who allegedly
killed another youth.' Publication of a juvenile delinquent's name
without written approval of the juvenile court violated state law and
triggered punitive action against the news media.45 The Court invali-
dated the West Virginia statute because it punished the press for pub-
lishing lawfully obtained, truthful information.46 The Court held that
the State failed to demonstrate that criminal sanctions were needed to
further the state interest.47 The Court concluded that the interest in
protecting the identity of the juvenile offender does not outweigh the
press' right to publish publicly revealed information.
48
40. Id. at 52. But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 761-63 (1985) (noting that not all speech is entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 747-48 (1978) (stating that vulgar,
offensive or shocking speech is not entitled to absolute First Amendment protection).
The Court in Falwell, however, did not believe these exceptions applied to the facts of
this case. 485 U.S. at 56.
41. 485 U.S. at 56.
42. Dicke, supra note 3, at 1577.
43. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
44. Id. at 99. Information from seven different eyewitnesses lead to the arrest of a
14 year old boy who shot and killed his classmate in Junior High School in West Vir-
ginia. Id. The Charleston Gazette published the juvenile's name and picture in an arti-
cle detailing the shooting. Id.
45. W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1976), construed in Smith, 443 U.S. at 98. Violators of
the West Virginia statute are fined up to one hundred dollars and/or confined to no
more than six months in jail. Id. § 49-7-20.
46. 443 U.S. at 105-06. Reporters obtained their information through witnesses, the
police and an assistant prosecuting attorney. Id. at 99.
47. Id. at 105-06. The State claims that publication of a juvenile offender's name
has an oppressive effect on the rehabilitation process. In the State's view, such exposure
stigmatizes the juvenile and leads to damaging consequences, such as anti-social con-
duct and jeopardizing future employment. Id. at 104. The Court rejected this argu-
ment, reasoning that criminal sanctions were not proper for this type of publication. Id.
at 106.
48. Id. at 104-06. See also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989) (noting
that when the government provides information to the media, a state's right to protect
individuals from press intrusion wanes); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
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The above-referenced cases illustrate the problems that states face
when enacting laws that define the content of publications. These deci-
sions, however, do not address the enforcement of general laws against
the press. When applying general laws to the press, courts apply a
lower level of scrutiny to the balancing test to expand press liability
and restrict constitutional protections. 49
Branzburg v. Hayes 50 illustrates the application of the lower level of
scrutiny. In Branzburg, a grand jury subpoenaed a news reporter to
identify his confidential sources. 51 A state court judge ordered the re-
porter to answer questions and rejected his First Amendment de-
fense.52 The Supreme Court held that journalists do not have an
absolute First Amendment right to withhold the identity of confiden-
tial sources from a grand jury.53 The Court reasoned that an absolute
reporters' privilege 54 would jeopardize defendants' rights to a fair
trial.55 The Court refuted the reporter's claim that this decision would
have a negative impact on his future ability to obtain news from credi-
ble sources. 56
491 (1975) (holding that states may not sanction the accurate publication of information
obtained from public records).
49. See Dicke, supra note 3, at 1577 nn.137-39 (requiring a showing of actual mal-
ice for plaintiff to recover for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress).
50. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
51. Id. at 668.
52. Id. The lower court also rejected defenses asserted under §§ 1, 2 and 8 of the
Kentucky Constitution and under § 421. 100 of the Kentucky reporters' privilege statute
which provides in part: "No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceed-
ing or trial before any court, or before any grand or petit jury... the source of any
information procured or obtained by him, and published in a newspaper.. .with which
he is connected." KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1962).
53. 408 U.S. at 708-09.
54. Neither the press nor an individual has a First Amendment privilege to refuse to
answer questions during a grand jury investigation. Id. at 690. Thus, the court finally
sets a place for state laws, which serve a substantial public interest, to be enforced
against the press and the public equally. See also Hirsch, supra note 23, at 206 (stating
that journalists lack the absolute privilege to withhold confidential sources from a grand
jury).
55. 408 U.S. at 690. Powell's concurrence stresses balancing the state interest in an
effective grand jury system against First Amendment protections. Id. at 709-10.
56. Id. at 682-84. In his dissent, Justice Stewart emphasized that "news must not
be unnecessarily cut off at its source" and that the right to gather news should not be
compromised. Id. at 728. However, Justice Powell stressed in his concurrence the lim-
ited nature of the Court's holding, stating "[t]he Court does not hold that newsmen,
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect
to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources." Id. at 709. Justice Powell
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In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,57 the Supreme
Court again refused to confer on the media immunity from generally
applicable laws. The Zacchini Court held that a television station was
not privileged to film a private performance without the consent of the
individuals involved. 8 The Supreme Court overruled the Ohio
Supreme Court's holding that, absent an attempt to harm or injure, the
media is constitutionally privileged to report matters of public inter-
est.5 9 The Court explained that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
do not privilege the media to violate an individual's right of publicity
guaranteed by state law.'
Recently, however, the United States District Court for Minnesota
extended to the press First Amendment protection against suits for
breach of confidentiality. In Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publication, Inc.,61
the court followed a three-step analysis 62 to determine whether the
suggested that certain confidentiality agreements may be enforceable depending on the
circumstances. Id. at 710. For example, if the confidential information is only remotely
related to the investigation, Powell stated that the reporter may be able to petition the
court for a protective order. Id.
Several courts have addressed the concern of whether potential sources would "dry
up" if reporter-source agreements were unenforceable. See Ruzicka v. Conde Nast
Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1299 (D. Minn. 1990) ("[S]ources will not be
willing to rely on reporters' promises of confidentiality if no remedy exists for breach."
(citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)); see
also Hirsch, supra note 23, at 208 (questioning whether it would be correct to protect
confidential sources from subpoena and yet allow the press to break its promise of confi-
dentiality whenever it chooses).
57. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
58. Id. at 578-79. Petitioner, an entertainer with a human cannonball act, sued a
television station for filming his performance without his consent. Id. at 562.
59. Id. at 578-79. In his dissent, Justice Powell stated that the public will be the
"loser" if such harsh restriction is placed on the media. 433 U.S. at 581 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
60. Id. at 578-79.
61. 733 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Minn. 1990), aff'd in part, 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991).
62. Id. at 1295. The three-step analysis used for breach of confidentiality contracts
begins by questioning, first, whether any state action is present to implicate First
Amendment scrutiny, and second, whether the media waived its First Amendment
rights by entering into the contract. Id. If the answer to both questions is affirmative,
the contract is enforceable. Id. If the contract lacks one or both of the first two criteria,
however, the court proceeds to a third step in which it applies a compelling state inter-
est balancing test to weigh competing interests of the state and the press. Id. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 257 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989), applied the Ruzicka balancing test. The Supreme Court declined, how-
ever, to follow the balancing test in Cohen, relying instead on the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2517 (1991).
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First Amendment protects the media from breach of contract ac-
tions.6 3 The court concluded that due to the particular facts of the
case," the confidentiality agreement between the reporter and source
was too vague to be enforceable.6 5 Moreover, the court stated that oral
contracts raise serious problems of proof66 and create the potential for
expensive and vexatious litigation.67 Consequently, the Supreme Court
will not abridge constitutional rights of the press unless there is unam-
biguous proof that a contract was formed and that the infringement is
incidental in nature.68
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 69 presented the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to balance the First Amendment against contract law.7°
In Cohen, the Court held that the plaintiff could enforce a newspaper's
breach of a confidentiality agreement through promissory estoppel.7 1
The Court determined that recovery under the promissory estoppel
63. 733 F. Supp. at 1295.
64. Plaintiff was interviewed by a reporter for an article about sexual abuse by ther-
apists. Id. at 1290. Plaintiff consented to the interview subject to the condition that she
would not be identified or identifiable and the reporter agreed to this condition. Id. at
1291. The Court held that since plaintiff did not specify what particular facts would
threaten her anonymity, the contract was too ambiguous to be enforced. Id. at 1300-01.
65. "IT]he Constitution requires plaintiffs in contract actions to enforce a reporter-
source agreement to prove specific, unambiguous terms and to provide clear and con-
vincing proof that the agreement was breached." Id. at 1300.
66. Id. See also, Dicke, supra note 3, at 1570 ("[I]mprecision and the oral nature of
many confidentiality agreements raise serious problems of proof.").
67. 733 F. Supp. at 1300. See also Dicke, supra note 3, at 1571 n.102 (stating that
examples of vexatious litigation include suits which look to punish, intimidate and har-
ass the media instead of looking to "seek compensation for actual injury").
68. Dicke, supra note 3, at 1573 & n. 116. Ruzicka did not raise a promissory estop-
pel claim at the district court trial; however, she did invoke an estoppel claim on ap-
peal. Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1991). On
review, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that promises of confidentiality be-
tween journalists and sources do not constitute a legal contract under Minnesota law.
Id. at 582. Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Cohen, however, the Eighth
Circuit allowed Ruzicka to raise a promissory estoppel claim. Id. at 583. The court
remanded the case to the District Court to consider whether a promissory estoppel
claim is a viable theory of recovery under Minnesota law. Id.
69. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
70. For an in-depth discussion of balancing the First Amendment and contract law,
see Hirsch, supra note 23, at 193-202.
71. 111 S. Ct. at 2516. This conclusion ignores the Minnesota Supreme Court's
finding that the newspapers' promises to keep Cohen's identity confidential were not
enforceable under the promissory estoppel doctrine. 457 N.W.2d at 205.
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theory constituted state action,72 triggering First Amendment protec-
tion.73 The Court also noted that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
is a generally applicable law which does not offend the First Amend-
ment right to freedom of the press.74 The Court concluded that the
Minnesota Supreme Court should readdress petitioner's promissory es-
toppel claim as a viable theory for recovery.75
The Cohen Court also determined that applying the state promissory
estoppel doctrine does not inhibit truthful reporting.76 The Court rea-
soned that respondents obtained petitioner's name by breaching its
promise, thereby making the acquisition unlawful.77 Thus, while the
purpose of the First Amendment is to protect and encourage journal-
ists to report news of public interest, it does not confer a constitutional
right to disregard contractual promises.73
In dissent, Justice Blackmun urged that the majority's reliance on
the line of cases addressing enforcement of generally applicable laws
was misplaced. 79 Concluding that the Sullivan line of decisions con-
trolled,'o Blackmun emphasized that whenever state law attempts to
penalize free expression, the state interest must be compelling to with-
stand the strictures of the First Amendment.81 In a separate dissenting
opinion, Justice Souter reiterated the argument that laws of general
72. Id. at 2517-18. See supra note 17 for a description of "state action."
73. 111 S. Ct. at 2517-18. The Supreme Court rejected the Ruzicka court's balanc-
ing test, emphasizing that the press voluntarily entered into the confidentiality agree-
ment. Id. at 2519. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Ruzicka court's balancing approach.
74. 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19. See also supra note 7 for an explanation of a law of
general application.
75. 111 S. Ct. at 2519-20.
76. Id. at 2519.
77. Id. The Court distinguished this case from Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524
(1989) where a rape victim's name was lawfully obtained through public records. Id.
78. Id.
79. 111 S. Ct. at 2520-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In the dissent's view, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's decision was premised "not on the identity of the speaker, but
on the speech itself." Id. at 2520. Accordingly, under Justice Blackmun's reasoning,
state law did not afford special immunity to the press and, consequently, reliance on the
general law cases was inappropriate. Id. See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the line of cases interpreting application of the general laws.
80. Id. at 2521. The dissent regarded the Falwell decision as directly on point. Id.
See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Falwell decision.
81. Id. at 2522.
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applicability were not dispositive in the case. 2 Justice Souter stated
that the proper approach was to balance the State's interest in enforc-
ing the newspaper's promise of confidentiality against the press' First
Amendment rights.8 3 The dissenting opinions concluded that the
State's interest was not compelling, and could therefore not survive
First Amendment scrutiny. 4
The Cohen majority correctly reversed the Minnesota Supreme
Court's holding85 and properly applied the line of cases that refuse to
grant reporters a special privilege denied to other citizens.8 6 The Court
has consistently prohibited states from enacting laws that directly in-
fringe upon the rights and privileges of the press.8 7 The Cohen deci-
sion, however, involves a state-law that was not intended to single out
news reporters' conduct.88 Application of such a general law must be
applied with an even hand.89 To allow the press to hide behind a shield
of confidentiality when they have broken the law would be
unconscionable. 90
Moreover, the Cohen decision does not take away any established
legal right of the press." Confidentiality agreements inherently re-
strain editorial freedom to publish what media institutions have
82. 111 S. Ct. at 2522 (Souter, L, dissenting). Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Sou-
ter concluded that the Sullivan line of cases controlled. Id.
83. Id. at 2522-23. Justice Souter's dissent rejected the majority's position that bal-
ancing was improper because the newspapers voluntarily entered into the confidentiality
agreements. Id.
84. Id. at 2522-23.
85. Unlike the Minnesota Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that the rationale which justifies protecting the media in defamation actions is
not applicable to breach of confidentiality agreements. 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
86. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text discussing cases in which the
court held that general laws apply to the press.
87. See supra notes 30-47 and accompanying text discussing cases in which the
court held that state interests did not outweigh freedoms of the press.
88. See supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text illustrating the conflicts between
general applicable laws and the press' First Amendment rights.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 111 S. Ct. at 2518. The Court stated that:
Generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and
reports the news... Neither does the First Amendment relieve a newspaper re-
porter of the obligation shared by all citizens to respond to a grand jury subpoena
rdJ .
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learned.92 The agreements represent self-imposed restraints that
members of the press have voluntarily promised not to breach.93 Ac-
cordingly, legal enforcement of the promissory estoppel theory is in the
best interest of both the public and the press.
As a matter of general welfare, if the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the press continues to grow without restrictions, certain
individual rights will suffer. The privilege to form a contract and ex-
pect it to be upheld should be appreciated by every person and institu-
tion in society. Accordingly, the Cohen decision should not be viewed
as a limitation on First Amendment privileges but as a necessary step
to ensure the protection and enforcement of every individual's legal
and fundamental rights.
Susan S. Greenebaum*
92. Dicke, supra note 3, at 1569.
93. Id. See supra note 27.
* J.D. 1993, Washington University.
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